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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

SOUTH KAMAS IRRIGATION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 9168

PROVO RIVER WATER USERS'
ASSOCI~TION,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T
S'T~TEMENT

OF CASE
This action was filed by plaintiff below, being
the appellant herein, pursuant to and under the
provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah,
Chapter 33 of 'Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
(R. 4). Appellant sought to have the Court below
adjudicate solely as against respondent (defendant
1
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below) that appellant, as a stockholder in the respondent corporation is entitled to use and employ
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities of the
Provo River Project (which admittedly are owned
by the United States) to convey private non-project
water for the sole benefit of appellant's own stockholders. (R. '3, 4, 5). Respondent herein filed its
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground,
among others, that the United States of America
is an indispensable party in this action and had
not been joined as a party. (R. 8, 9). In support
of the foregoing motion respondent served and filed,
pursuant to Rule 43 (e), U.R.C.P., an affidavit
(R. 10) with attached Exhibit "A" (R. 10-2'3 incl.),
identified as a true and correct copy of the contract
between respondent and the United States of America dated June 27, 1'9'36, and Exhibit "B", (R.
24-31 incl.) identified as a true and correct copy
of the Articles of Incorporation of respondent.
The trial Court, after having fully considered
the pleadings on file, the proof offered by the parties and the arguments of counsel, found that the
United States of America is an indispensable party
in this action and that the United States could not
be brought before the court without its consent and
such consent had not been given. Thereupon the
trial Court entered its judgment dismissing the
Complaint (R. 3'3) from which plaintiff filed its
2
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Notice of Appeal. ( R. 34). No Answer was filed
and no trial was had upon the merits. 'The sole point
of this appeal, therefore, is whether the trial Court
erred in ruling that the United 'States of America
is an indispensable party, and in dismissing the
action. ( R. 40) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent can only agree in part with the
Statement of· Facts set forth in the brief of appellant since ·a number of the facts recited therein
either go beyond the record or are not supported
thereby. For tjhis reason we deem it proper to forInulate a Statement of Facts which we belieye to
be supported by the record. In developing the facts
respondent is mindful of the ru'le that for the purpose of this appeal we must assume that the allegations of the material facts set forth in appellant's
complaint are true even though respondent may
deny the same. Wherever in this brief we assume
such facts to be true it is because of suCh rule and
for the purpose of this appeal only. In addition
thereto, some of the facts hereinafter recited appear
in the records of the Utah State Engineer and we
agree with appellant that this Court may take judicial notice of such records.
Respondent is a non-profit corporation organized as a Water Users Association to meet the requirements of U. S. Reclamation Act of June 17,
3
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1902, and acts amendatory thereof and supplemental
thereto. (R. 26). On June 27, 1936, respondent

entered in to a con tract in writing with the United
States of America for the construction of the Deer
Creek Division of the Provo River Project by the
United States of America. (R. 10-23 incl.). One of
the features of the project is the construction of
the Duchesne ·Tunnel for the purpose of diverting
project waters from the North Fork of the Duchesne
River and conveying the same to the Provo River
for storage in the Deer Creek Reservoir. (R. 10,
13, 14). 'Title to the project works constructed by
the United States, including the Duchesne 'Tunnel,
is in the United States and shall remain in the
!United States until otherwise provided for by Congress. (R. 21, 22). Title to the project water rights
is in 'the United States of America. (R. 12, 13).
Respondent has agreed to repay the entire cost of
the project to the United States. (R. 18).
Respondent is entitled to the total yield of
storage water from the project and is entitled to
utilize the project works upon payment by respondent to the Un'ited States of the payments provided
for in said contract. (R. 15). All of the rights of
respondent to utilize the project works, including
the Duchesne 'Tunnel, and to use the water yielded
by the project are derived from and are subject
to the Hmi ta tions of the contract with the United
States of America. ( R. 10-23 incl.).
4
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Appellant is a stockholder in the respondent
corporation. ( R. 3). There is no issue as to the project water to which appellant is entitled by reason
of its stock ownership in respondent association.
Appellant is the owner of Application No. 16063
filed with the Utah 'State Engineer to appropriate
25 second feet of water from Little Deer Creek,
a trrbutary to the North Fork of the Duchesne River.
(R. 3). 'The water which appellant claims the right
to use under Application No. 16063 is water which
it claims in its own right for use solely 'by its own
stockholders and is not a part of the project waters.
'This action was commenced by appellant to establish
a right solely as against respondent to use the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities to convey the
water to which it claims it is entitled under said
Application No. 16063 from the Duchesne River
drainage to the Provo River channel. Appellant readily admits that 'legal title to the project works, including the Duchesne Tunnel, is in 'the U n'i ted States.
(Appellant's Brief, pages 2, 16). 'The sole point on
this appeal is whether the trial Court erred in its
rulings that the United States of America is an
indispensable party and in dismissing the complaint.
(R. 40).

Although most of the facts presented in appellant's brief which go beyond the record are immaterial insofar as this appeal is concerned we feel
5
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constrained to point those out since appellant
has devoted a substantial portion of its argument
to such facts. There is nothing in the record to show
that the water which appellant claimed the right
to use under Application No. 16063 has been captured and used by respondent as is recited on page
3 of appellant's brief and is argued on pages 16, 17
and 19 thereof. We have examined the file of Application No. '30389 in the office of the State Engineer
and find nothing which even remotely suggests that
'''the Bureau has made repeated effor~ to induce
. : ' the State Engineer to lapse appellaAe~ appr6ved
application" as stated on Page 3 of appellant's brief.
Nor is there anything in the record to show that
'''If the Bureau is successful, the use and benefit
of the water will go, as it now does, to respondent
Association, just as does all Project water" as is
recited on Page 3 of appellant's bri~f and is argued
on pages 17 and 19 thereof.
We are at a loss as to where appellant finds
the foregoing facts or why appellant believes it
proper to recite and argue the same in this appeal.
We can only conclude that appellant is attempting
to avoid the real issue by injecting unfounded inferrences and insinuations in an obvious attempt to
discredit respondent and thus to bolster a case otherwise without merit. In answer thereto we merely
call this Court's attention to the file of appellant's
6
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Applica'tion No. 16063 in the office of the State
Engineer of which this Court can take judicial
notice under the case of McGary vs. Thompson, 114
Utah 442, 201 P. 2nd 288, cited on page 3 of appellant's brief. The foregoing file reveals that appellant gained approval of Application No. 16063 upon
its representation to the State Engineer that it
would construct its own tunnel and diversion works
and submitted reports to show that such tunnel and
works were feasible and that it had the financial
ability to do so. With the foregoing clearing of the
air we direct our attention to our argument of the
issues of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN 'THIS ACTION BECAUSE
I'T OWNS THE DUCHESNE TUNNEL AND CONNECTED FACILITIES IN WHICH APPELLAN'T SEEKS TO
ADJUDICATE A RIGHT OF USE.
POINT II
'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THIS ACTION BECAUSE
ANY RIGHT WHICH APPELLAN'T MIGH'T HAVE AS
A STOCKHOLDER OF RESPONDEN'T TO USE THE
DUCHE'SNE TUNNEL AND CONNECTED FACILI'TIES
MUST BE FOUNDED UPON THE CONTRACT BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND THE UNI'TED STATES.
7
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POINT III
SINCE THE UNITED STATES I'S AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THIS ACTION AND HAS NOT WAIVED ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE 'TRIAL COUR'T
DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 'THE COMPLAINT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I'S AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THIS ACTION BECAUSE
IT OWNS 'THE DUCHESNE TUNNEL AND CONNECTED FACILITIES IN WHICH APPELLANT SEEKS TO
ADJUDICA'TE A RIGHT OF USE.

The only issue on this appeal is whether the
United States of America, as the owner of the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities, is an indispensable party in this action. If that issue is answered in the affirmative, which we respectfully
submit it must be, the judgment of the trial Court
in dismissing this action must be affirmed.
As we view this matter the dispute involved in
this appeal revolves around what the appellant seeks
to accomplish by its complaint. Appellant argues
that the only question it seeks to answer is whether
appellant, as a stockholder in respondent association, has the right to use in common with other
stockholders of the respondent, whatever right respondent has to use the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities without seeking a determination
of wha;t those rights are. However, it is obvious
8
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that nppellant is seeking to adjudicate a right to
convey non-project water through the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities which admittedly are
owned by the United States of America.
Appellan't alleges in its complaint that it has
a certain water right (Application No. 16063) for
25 second feet of water from Little Deer Creek Which
can be most 'beneficially used if appellant asserts
its claimed right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and
connected facilities to bring said .water through
the Duchesne Tunnel and discharge the same into
the Provo River Channel for use by its stockholders.
(R. 3, 4). Yet the file of Application No. 16063 in
the office of the State Engineer reveals that appellant gained approval thereof upon its representation
that it would construct its own tunnel and diversion works and submitted reports to show that such
tunnel and works were feasible and that it had the
financial ability to so do. 'The prayer of appellant's
complaint when stripped of its legal conclusions
and unwarranted inferrences of fact prays the Court
to "adjudicate, declare and determine that plaintiff
(appellant) is entitled .... to use and employ ... .
the Duchesne 'Tunnel and connected facilities ... ".
The United States of America is admittedly the
owner of the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities which were constructed by the United States
as an essential part of the Deer Creek Division of
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the Provo River Project. Legal title to the project
works in their entirety is to remain in the United
States until otherwise provided for by Congress.
(R. 18, 19). This is in accord with Section 6 of the
Reclamation Act of June 1'7, 1902, 4'3 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 498, page 343, and is readily conceded by appellant on Pages 2 and 16 of its brief. ·Thus, appellant seeks to adjudicate in itself a right to use the
Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities, title to
which admittedly is in the United States of America.
It is well ~ettled law that a proceeding against
property in wh'ich the United States has an interest
is a suit against the United States. Minnesota vs.
United States, 305 U.S. 382, 59 S. Ct. 292, 83 L. Ed.
2'35; United States vs. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 61
S. Ct. 1011, 85 L. Ed. 1327; Maricopa County vs.
Valley National Bank, 318 U.'S. 357, 63 S. Ct. 587,
'87 L. Ed. 834. 'This Court recognized and adopted
this rule in the case of Randolf Land and Livestock
Company vs. United States, 2 U. 2nd 208, 271 P.
2nd 846. It was there concerned with the question
of whether the proceeding was a suit against the
United Sta:tes. On Page 212 of the Utah Reports it
is pointed out that the United States Supreme Court
has held tha:t where a judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain it is a
suit against the sovereign. It was then noted that if
the objectors therein prevailed in their appeal, the
10
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result would be that the government would lose its
water rights and under the definition above was a
suit against the government. In the instant case if
appellant were to prevail on the merits the judgment would in effect grant appellant an easement
over property owned by the United States and certainly would expend itself on the public domain.
lVIr. Justice Crockett, speaking for the majority of
the court on Page 212 of 'the Utah Reports, then
stated:
"It is elemental that the Federal Government cannot be sued without its consent and
it has been held that there is no distinction
between suits against the government directly
and suits against its property." (citing cases)~
There can be no dispute that this is a proceeding against property in which the United States has
an interest. How can it be otherwise when appellant
seeks to establish a right to use property admittedly
owned by the United States. The fact that appellant
seeks to establish only as against respondent a right
to use the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities
to convey non-project water does not alter the rule.
Whether an action is one against the sovereign is
determined not by the party named as defendant
but by the effect of the decree that m~ay be entered.
Michal v. Nalder, 174 F. Supp. 546; Ogden River
Water Users Association v. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District, 238 F. 2nd 936; Larson v.
]_]_
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Domestic and For.eign Commerc,e Corporation, 337
U.S. 682, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 93 L. Ed. 1628. In the instant case appellant prays the Court to enter judgment "tha:t plaintiff (appellant) is entitled ... to
use and employ .... the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities .... ''. The effect of the decree which
m'ight be entered if appellant were to prevail on the
merits would be to grant appellant a right to use
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities to convey its own private non-project water for use by
its own stockholders. Yet title to those works is
admittedly in the United States. The conclusion
is inescapable that this is a proceeding against property in which the United States not only has an
interest but owns legal title thereto.
'The law is equally well settled that in any suit
which affects title to property which is in the United
States, the Ug~ted States is an indispensable party.
Minnesota vs. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 59 S. Ct.
292, 83 L. Ed. 235; United States vs. Alabama, 313
U.S. 274,61 S. Ct. 1011,85 L. Ed. 1327; Skeenvs.
Lynch, 10 Cir., 48 F. 2nd 1044, Cert. denied, 284
U.S. 633, 5'2 S. Ct. 17, 76 L. Ed. 539; Trueman Fertilizer Company vs. Larson, 196 F. 2nd 910; Michal
vs. Nalder, 174 F. Supp. 546; Ogden River Water
Us,ers Association vs. W~eber Basin Water Conservancy District, 2'38 F. 2nd 936.
In Minnesota vs. United States, supra, it was
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held that the United States was an indispensable
party in an a~tion by a state to condemn a right-ofway over nine parcels of land allotted to Indians,
legal title to which is held by the United States as
trusteee. In United States vs. Alabama, supra, it
was held tha:t the United States was an indispensable party to proceedings in a state court for the
sale of lands under a tax sale which took place after
the United States had become the owner thereof.
In Skeen vs. Lynch, supra, it was held that the
United States was an indispensible party to an action to quiet title to o'il and gas as against the governments prospecting perm:lttees where plaintiffs
patent under a Homestead entry contained the exception "except all coal and other minerals, etc... "
and where the United States claimed title to the
oil and gas. In Trueman Fertilizer Company vs.
Larson, supra, it was held that the United States
was an indispensable party in an action for a declaratory judgment to declare that the lands on which
plaintiff held a judgment lien and which had been
turned over to the General Services Administration
as surplus upon the termination of the use for which
the lands had been acquired by the United States
by eminent domain had reverted to their former
owner and were again subject to the judgment lien.
In Michal vs. Nalder, supra, decided May 18, 1'959,
an action was brought against the project manager
1

13
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of the Columbia Basin Project for the Bureau of
Reclamation to grant plaintiff's application for
water. It was held that the suit was essentially one
to reach water and facilities for :its transportation
o'vned by the United States and both the United
States and the Secretary of Interior were indispensable parties.
The case of Ogden Riv.er Water Users Association vs. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District,
238 F. 2nd 936, is very closely in point to the instant
case. In that case the Ogden River Water Users Association, a non-profit Corporation very similar to
respondent, had entered into a contract in May, 1934,
with the United States under the terms of which
the Un':ited States acquired certain lands and water
:rights for the construction of the Ogden River Project. 'The contract, being very similar to the contract
of respondent, provided that the initial cost of acquisition and construction of the Ogden River Project (the heart of which is the P'ine View Dam and
Reservoir) was to be financed by the United States
but to be repaid by the Ogden Association through
annual installment payments. 'The Ogden Association acquired a permanent right to 'the annual yield
of the water from the project as constructed and,
subject to certain supervisory rights of the United
S'ta:tes, was given possessory rights to the lands
and appurtenances for operational purposes, the
14
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same as respondent has with respect to the Provo
River Project. Lega;l title to the p~oject works was
to remain in the United States until otherwis,e provided for by Congress. Subsequently, the United
States entered into a contract with the Weber Basin
Wa:ter Conservancy District for the construction of
the Weber Basin Project which included the enlargement of Pine View Reservoir. 'The ·Ogden Association filed a complaint in the Federal D'istrict Court
of Utah under the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201, and under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1331, naming the conservancy district; E. 0. Larson
personally and as Regional Director of the Bureau
of Reclamation; Clinton D. Woods, personally and
as Project Manager of the Weber Basin Project and
the Utah Construction Company, a:s parties defendant, asking the Court to adjudge, among other
tllings, that the Ogden Association owned the equita;ble title to the lands comprising the Ogden River
Project and 'to enjoin 'the enlargement of Pine View
Reservoir unless just compensation be paid. The
United States was not joined as a party. Motions
to dismiss were filed upon the grounds 'tha:t the
United States and the Secretary of Interior were
indispensable parties. The trial Court granted the
motions and dismissed fue complain:t, which was
affirmed by the Tenth Circu'it Court of Appeals.
On page 941 of the Federal Reporter the Court
stated:
15
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"Under the terms of each of these contracts the United States obtains, retains and
grants certain property righ'ts and no judicial
determination of the extent of the rights
granted or retained can be had without the
United States being a party to the action.
Legal title to all lands and appurtenances involved in this controversy rests in the Un!ted
'States and no determination affecting that
ti'tle can be made that would bind the Uni'ted
States or validly interpret the government's
contractual rights or obligations. Skeen v.
Lynch, 10 Cir., 48 F. 2nd 1044, certiorari
denied, 284 U.S. 63:3, 52 S. Ct. 1'7, 76 L. Ed.
539; Carr vs. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 25
L. Ed. 209; Wood vs. Phillips, 4 Cir., 50 F.
2nd 714."
On page 942 of the Federal Reporter it is further stated:
"A decree adjudging that appellant owns
the equitable title in and to the lands comprising the Ogden River Project, including Pine
View Dam and Reservoir, though not binding
upon the United States, would serve under the
instan t facts, to embarass the government's
title and throw confusion upon the reclamation project. In the absence of the United
States, this portion of the relief sought would
be improper."
1

Under the admitted facts of this case and the
authorities cited above the conclusion is inescapable
'that th'is is a proceeding against property in which
the United S'ta tes ndt only has an interest but owns
legal title thereto. Any judicial determination that
1

16
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appellant or anyone else has a right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities canndt be
had without the United Sta:tes being a party to the
action.
We have no real quarrel with the general principles of law cited 'in appellant's brief pertaining
'to indispensab'le and necessary parties as far as
such principles go except to point out that under
Rule 19 (b) U. R. C. P., it is still discretionary with
fue trial Court whether 'to proceed to judgment in
'the absence of even conditionally necessary parties.
However, such principles merely set forth general
policies to aid as a guide in determining who are
indispensable parties which might be helpful but
do not solve the problem at hand. Our quarrel seems
to be centered around what the appellant is seeking
to accomplish by its complaint. Appellant very strenuously argues that it merely seeks to adjudicate that
appellant, as a stockholder in respondent association, has the right to use in common with 'the other
stockholders of respondent, whatever rights respondent has to use the Duchesne Tunnel and connected
facilities without seeking an adjudication of what
those rights are. It then argues that the United
States has no interest at all in 'this action and could
not even qualify as a proper party. Respondent
contends however, that appel'lant in truth and in fact
is asking the Court 'to adjudicate that appellant has
17
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a right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and connected
facilities to convey its own private non-project water
for its own private use irrespecttive of the legal
theory it employs. If not, appellant is merely seeking an advisory opinion to test out some pet legal
theory which the Court does not have the power to
do. Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 6, Sec. "57.11,
page 3051.
We respectfully submit that the Uni'ted States
of America is an indispensable party in this action
since it owns the Duchesne Tunnel and connected
facilities in which appellant seeks to adjudicate a
right of use to convey its own priva'te non-project
water for its own private use.
POINT II
'THE UNITED S'TATE'S OF AMERICA IS -AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN. THIS ACTION BECAUSE
ANY RIGHT WHICH APPELLANT MIGHT HAVE AS
A STOCKHOLDER OF RESPONDENT TO USE THE
DUCHE'SNE TUNNEL AND CONNECTED FACILITIES
M'UST BE FOUNDED UPON 'THE CONTRACT BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND THE UNITED STATES.

It is alleged that respondent is a mutual water
corporation and it is, if at all, in a strictly limited
sense i.e., 'tha't it furnishes water only to its stockholders and not for profit or hire. Kinney, Law of
Irriga:tion and Water Rights, Volume 3, Sec. 1480,
page 2659. However, respondent is fundamentally
different from the so-called mutual water corporation 'in that neither its wa'ter rights nor its distribution or storage facilities are derived from its
18
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stockholders but instead title to those are in the
United States and respondent merely has a contractual right to their use. The respondent water
users association is unique in its character and
was organized for a special purpose. Kinney, in
his trea tise on the Law of Irrigation and Water
Rights, Volume 3, Sec. 1281, gives a clear explanatim:). of the ·~b~e~~s of ~:th~ W ~ter Users Association.
On·Page 2'319 he states:
" "'Therefore, under ·the authority of the
Act, as above set forth, corporations known
as 'Water Use:rs Associations' are organized
QY the actual or conte~plated water users of
the water furnished from each of these reclamation projects. ·The objeets of the organization of these corporations are twofold: First,
to have some responsible organization, acceptable to the Secretary of the Interior, to which
the management and- operation of such irrigation works may, as contemplated by the
Act, be eventually turned; and, second, owing
to the fact that in practically all of these
Government projects, there are several hundreds or even thousands of land owners, who
are, or are contemplated water users, and who
claim their rights by private ownership, or
from applications under the provisions of the
Act itself, it was found essential at an early
stage of the operations under the Act to create
one organization, so that the Government
instead of dealing with hundreds of individuals separately could transact the business
with one organization or with a small committee of men representing all of the water
users under any particular project."
1

1

'i
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Thus it can be seen that respondent has many
attributes quite different in object and purpose from
the so-called mutua'l water corporation.
Appellant is one of the stockholders of respondent. It is also the owner of Application No. 16063
in which neither the respondent nor the United
States has any interest. Appellant obtained the approval of Application No. 16063 upon its representation to the State Engineer that it would construct
its own 'tunnel and diversion works to convey such
waters and submitted reports to show that such
tunnel and works were feasible and that it had the
financial ability to construct the same.
In spite of the foregoing appellant asserts that
as a stockholder in respondent association, it is
entitled to use and employ in common with the other
stockholders of respondent the Duchesne Tunnel and
connected facilities, admittedly owned 'by the United
States, to convey private non-project water for the
sole use of appellant's stockholders. This, it asserts
under an assumed abstract principle of law, for
which it cites no authority and repeatedly takes for
granted that such is the law. With this respondenf
strongly disagrees. In the first place if respondent
is a so-·ca1led mutual water corporation, it is only
in a strictly limited sense, i.e., it furnishes water
only to its stockholders.. Respondent merely has a
contractual right of use of the Duchesne Tunnel and
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connected facilities and title thereto is in the United
StatE:s. In the second place there is no mutuality
connected with the water claimed by appellant under
Application No. 16063. It is water foreign to the
project in which neither respondent nor its other
stockholders nor the United States has any interest.
It is claimed by appel'lant in its own right for the
private use of its own stockholders. With respect to
such water appellant stands in the same position as
any outsider who is not a stockholder in the respondent association and who could not successfully assel~t such right. In addition thereto, neither respondent nor any other stockholder of respondent has
the right asserted by appellant to use the Duchesne
Tunnel and connected facilities to convey non-project water. Respondent could not voluntarily grant
appel'lant the right it seeks. How then can appellant
or the Court exact from respondent by compulsion
that which respondent cannot voluntarily grant!
Finally, all of the rights of respondent and its stockholders to utilize the Duchesne Tunnel and connected
facilities are founded upon the contract between the
United Sta:tes and respondent. The existence or nonexistence of the right which appellant asserts does
not stem from any abstract principle of law as appellant repeatedly assumes. The right asserted by
appellant as a stockholder of respondent to utilize
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities to
convey non-project water, if such right does exist,
21
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can only have its origin from the contract between
the respondent and the United States. The only
rights which respondent has to utilize such facilities
are derived from that contract and it necessarily
follows tha:t any right which appellant might have
as a stockholder of respondent to utilize such facilities is founded upon the same contract.
Appellant repeatedly argues that it does not
seek 'to interpret the contract between the respondent and the United States in this action and that
this action is merely the first step in its time-table
of conquest. It outlines step two as a stockholders
derivative suit against the United States to establish the rights of respondent under the contract. Yet
·it ci'tes no waiver of immunity to bring 'that type of
suit and we submit that there is none. However,
neither does respondent seek to interpret the contract except insofar as it has already been interpreted by appellant, i.e., that the United States of
America owns the Duchesne Tunnel and connected
facilities. Respondent does contend that the determination of 'the existence or non-existence of the
right asserted by appellant is dependent upon
whether 'the United States has, under the contract
granted or retained such right. It necessarily follows that no judicial determination of the existence
or of the extent of the rights granted or retained
by the United States under that contract can be had
22
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without the United States being a party in this
action. Ogden River Water Us.ers Association v.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, 238 F.
2nd 9'36.
We respectfully submit that the fundamental
theory upon which appellant prosecutes its complaint is erroneous. It repeatedly assumes as an
abstract principle of law, without citing any authority in support 'thereof, that appellant as a stockholder in the respondent association has the righ't
to use and employ the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facili'ties to convey private non-project water
for its own private use. Respondent of course denies
that such is the law or that the existence or nonexistence of the asserted right can be determined as
an abstract principle of law. If the asserted right
exists a:t all it is derived from the contract between
the United States and respondent. 'The Un'ited States
is an indispensable party 'to any judicial determination of the existence or non-existence of the right.
POIN'T III
SINCE THE UNITED ST~TES IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN 'THIS ACTION AND H~S NOT WAIVED ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 'THE 'TRIAL COUR'T
DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 'THE COMPLAINT.

Apparently appellant does not dispute the action of the trial Court in dismissing the Complaint
if it is determined that the United States is an indispensable party in 'this action. The law is clear
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that if the United States is an indispensable party,
and has not consented to be sued, the action must
be dismissed. Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 3,
Sec. 19.15, page 2185. The United States has not
waived its sovereign immunity from sui'ts for declaratory relief. Iludspeth County Conservation and
Reclamation District vs. Robbins, et. al., ·21'3 F. 2nd
425; Love vs. United States, 108 F. 2nd 43, Cert.
den'ied, 309 U.S. 673; Trueman Fertiliz.er Co. vs.
Larson, 196 F. 2nd 910.
Since the trial Court properly determined that
the United States is an indispensable party in this
action and such party has not consented to be sued,
we respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial Court dismissing appellant's complaint must
be affirmed.
1

CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks a judicial determination solely
as against respondent that appellant, as a stockholder of respondent corporation, is entitled to use
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities to convey private non-project water which it claims for use
solely by its own stockholders. The United Sta:tes is
admittedly the owner of the Duchesne Tunnel and
connected facilities. This action is a proceeding
against property in which the United States has an
interest and affects title to property which is in the
United States. Under the adjudicated cases the
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United States is clearly an indispensable party in
this action.
If respondent is a mutual irrigation corporation at all, it is so only in a strictly limited sense,
i.e., it furnishes water only to its stockholders. In
all other respects it is different. The fundamental
theory upon which appellant prosecutes its complaint is erroneous. Neither respondent nor any of
its stockholders have 'the right to utilize the project
facilities owned by the United States to convey nonproject water. Respondent canno't voluntarily grant
appellant the right 'it seeks and such right cannot
be exacted fro1n respondent through compulsion.
All of the rights of respondent to utilize the
project works and water yielded by the project are
founded upon contract with the United States. Any
rights of the stockholders of respondent to utilize
any of the project works are likewise derived from
the contract between respondent and the United
States. The United States is an indispensable party
to any judicial proceeding to determine the existence
and extent of any rights gran ted or retained under
the contract.
Respondent agrees that the most fundamental
concept of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that
every person should be entitled 'to his day in Court
as stated by appellant on page 15 of its brief. However, 'it is equally fundamental that when it is de25
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'termined by the Court that such person does ndt
have a cause of action, he has had his day in Court.
We respectfully submit that the trial Court
did not err in determining that the United S'ta'tes
of America is an indispensable party in this action
and since it has not waived its sovereign immunity,
the judgment of the 'trial Court in dismissing appellant's complaint must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FISHER HARRIS
JOSEPH NOVAK
Attorneys for
D,efendant and Respondent
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